"Cause" means (1) that from which, as immanent material, a thing
comes into being, e.g. the bronze is the cause of the statue and the
silver of the saucer, and so are the classes which include these.
(2) The form or pattern, i.e. the definition of the essence, and the
classes which include this (e.g. the ratio 2:1 and number in general
are causes of the octave), and the parts included in the definition.
(3) That from which the change or the resting from change first
begins; e.g. the adviser is a cause of the action, and the father a
cause of the child, and in general the maker a cause of the thing made
and the change-producing of the changing. (4) The end, i.e. that for
the sake of which a thing is; e.g. health is the cause of walking. For
"Why does one walk?" we say; "that one may be healthy"; and in
speaking thus we think we have given the cause. The same is true of
all the means that intervene before the end, when something else has
put the process in motion, as e.g. thinning or purging or drugs or
instruments intervene before health is reached; for all these are
for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that
some are instruments and others are actions.

    These, then, are practically all the senses in which causes are
spoken of, and as they are spoken of in several senses it follows both
that there are several causes of the same thing, and in no
accidental sense (e.g. both the art of sculpture and the bronze are
causes of the statue not in respect of anything else but qua statue;
not, however, in the same way, but the one as matter and the other
as source of the movement), and that things can be causes of one
another (e.g. exercise of good condition, and the latter of
exercise; not, however, in the same way, but the one as end and the
other as source of movement).-Again, the same thing is the cause of
contraries; for that which when present causes a particular thing,
we sometimes charge, when absent, with the contrary, e.g. we impute
the shipwreck to the absence of the steersman, whose presence was
the cause of safety; and both-the presence and the privation-are
causes as sources of movement.

    All the causes now mentioned fall under four senses which are
the most obvious. For the letters are the cause of syllables, and
the material is the cause of manufactured things, and fire and earth
and all such things are the causes of bodies, and the parts are causes
of the whole, and the hypotheses are causes of the conclusion, in
the sense that they are that out of which these respectively are made;
but of these some are cause as the substratum (e.g. the parts), others
as the essence (the whole, the synthesis, and the form). The semen,
the physician, the adviser, and in general the agent, are all
sources of change or of rest. The remainder are causes as the end
and the good of the other things; for that for the sake of which other
things are tends to be the best and the end of the other things; let
us take it as making no difference whether we call it good or apparent
good.

    These, then, are the causes, and this is the number of their
kinds, but the varieties of causes are many in number, though when
summarized these also are comparatively few. Causes are spoken of in
many senses, and even of those which are of the same kind some are
causes in a prior and others in a posterior sense, e.g. both "the
physician" and "the professional man" are causes of health, and both
"the ratio 2:1" and "number" are causes of the octave, and the classes
that include any particular cause are always causes of the
particular effect. Again, there are accidental causes and the
classes which include these; e.g. while in one sense "the sculptor"
causes the statue, in another sense "Polyclitus" causes it, because
the sculptor happens to be Polyclitus; and the classes that include
the accidental cause are also causes, e.g. "man"-or in general
"animal"-is the cause of the statue, because Polyclitus is a man,
and man is an animal. Of accidental causes also some are more remote
or nearer than others, as, for instance, if "the white" and "the
musical" were called causes of the statue, and not only "Polyclitus"
or "man". But besides all these varieties of causes, whether proper or
accidental, some are called causes as being able to act, others as
acting; e.g. the cause of the house's being built is a builder, or a
builder who is building.-The same variety of language will be found
with regard to the effects of causes; e.g. a thing may be called the
cause of this statue or of a statue or in general of an image, and
of this bronze or of bronze or of matter in general; and similarly
in the case of accidental effects. Again, both accidental and proper
causes may be spoken of in combination; e.g. we may say not
"Polyclitus" nor "the sculptor" but "Polyclitus the sculptor". Yet all
these are but six in number, while each is spoken of in two ways;
for (A) they are causes either as the individual, or as the genus,
or as the accidental, or as the genus that includes the accidental,
and these either as combined, or as taken simply; and (B) all may be
taken as acting or as having a capacity. But they differ inasmuch as
the acting causes, i.e. the individuals, exist, or do not exist,
simultaneously with the things of which they are causes, e.g. this
particular man who is healing, with this particular man who is
recovering health, and this particular builder with this particular
thing that is being built; but the potential causes are not always
in this case; for the house does not perish at the same time as the
builder.